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1. Introduction
Thailand, which is called the “Detroit of Asia”, is becoming a production 
and export base for automobiles in ASEAN. In 2012 Thailand produced 2.452 
million cars; 1,425,581 were sold in the domestic market and 1,026,671 were 
exported (see Table 1). The automobile industry is an important industry in 
Thailand, accounting for 7% of GDP. It has a very broad base, and it leads the 
economic development of Thailand⑴.
In the Thai automobile market, Japanese companies account for 90% of 
the market. Toyota Motor Thailand (TMT) accounts for almost 40% of the 
market. In 2004 TMT started the production of Innovative International 
Multi-purpose Vehicle (IMV), which are sold all over the world, focusing upon 
emerging markets. The IMV was the first new car project which started in a 
foreign subsidiary without producing and selling in Japan. TMT is the most 
important center of the IMV project.
Main research topics related to multinational corporations have so far 
focused on two aspects: (1) entry mode, that is, exclusive ownership, and joint 
venture (majority, minority, and 50-50 ownership), green field, and M&A, and 
(2) transfer of competitive edges from parent company to foreign subsidiar-
ies⑵.
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However, foreign subsidiaries have changed their relationships with par-
ent companies by accumulating their own management resources. Transfer 
of management resources and know-how is now being undertaken from sub-
sidiaries to parent companies and between subsidiaries. Self-sustenance of 
foreign subsidiaries creates MNC’s overall sustainable competitive advan-
tages.
Satoru Enomoto, Julian M. Birkinshaw, Yasuo Sugiyama and Nobuya Ori-
hashi have pointed out the importance of subsidiaries’ self-sustenance for 
multinationals. When we look at studies of foreign subsidiaries, we can find 
the following characteristics and problems. First, there are very few histori-
cal studies of foreign subsidiaries steps to self-sustenance by accumulating 
Table 1　Production, Sales, and Export of Automobiles in Thailand
Year 1995 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005
Production of Automobiles
Passenger Cars 117,007 97,129 156,066 169,321 251,691 299,439 277,603
Commercial Vehicles 365,786 314,592 303,352 415,630 498,821 628,642 847,713
Total 482,793 411,721 459,418 584,951 750,512 928,081 1,125,316
Domestic Sales of Automobiles
Passenger Cars 163,371 83,106 104,502 126,353 179,005 209,110 188,211
Commercial Vehicles 408,209 179,083 192,550 283,009 354,171 416,916 515,221
Total 571,580 262,189 297,052 409,362 533,176 626,026 703,432
Export of Automobiles
Total 152,836 175,299 181,471 235,022 332,057 440,715
Year 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012
Production of Automobiles
Passenger Cars 298,819 315,444 401,474 313,442 554,267 537,987 957,623
Commercial Vehicles 889,225 971,935 992,555 685,936 1,091,037 919,808 1,494,629
Total 1,188,044 1,287,379 1,394,029 999,378 1,645,304 1,457,795 2,453,717
Domestic Sales of Automobiles
Passenger Cars 191,763 170,118 226,805 230,487 437,796 360,444 672,460
Commercial Vehicles 490,398 461,133 388,465 318,384 362,561 433,637 763,875
Total 682,161 631,251 615,270 548,871 800,357 794,081 1,436,335
Export of Automobiles
Total 538,966 690,100 776,241 535,563 896,065 735,627 1,026,671
Source: “Car Statistic Report,” The Thai Automotive Industry Association.
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their own knowledge and know-how. Second, studies which have demon-
strated an awareness of the issues have dealt with very limited fields and 
periods. They have dealt with subsidiaries in advanced countries, not in 
developing countries. Third, many studies have pointed out the relationship 
between subsidiaries and outside management factors such as the host coun-
try’s industrial and foreign capital policies. There are very few studies which 
have analyzed the relationship between subsidiaries and external actors in 
other industries fully and empirically⑶.
In developing and emerging countries, catching up with advanced coun-
tries is a national objective. It is necessary for a nation to develop industrial 
clusters. In developing countries, there is no base to develop an automobile 
industry. Therefore, organized efforts by government and multinationals are 
necessary. Multinational companies play particularly important roles as hubs 
to develop value chains including designing of products, manufacturing and 
procuring parts, assembling cars, selling, and after service.
In this value chain, we can find some actors. The first actor is the gov-
ernment of the country concerned. It exerts an influence on developing the 
industry through industrial policies. The second is multinationals such as 
assemblers and parts manufacturers, who bring products and know-how into 
Thailand. The third is local entrepreneurs who want to start their own busi-
ness in the industry, including parts manufacturers and dealers. The fourth is 
local management and employees. Moreover, educational organizations such 
as universities and vocational schools, which provide the automobile industry 
with human resources, are also included⑷.
The purpose of this paper is to analyze how and why TMT established 
its solid status in the Thai automobile market, becoming an autonomous sub-
sidiary to manufacture and export IMV without having a mother plant in 
Japan. In addition to an analysis of the management of TMT, we analyze how 
and why TMT managed to solve problems caused by the changes in the 
dynamic relationship between TMT and outside actors, which brought about 
the develop of an industrial cluster and the self-sustenance of TMT.
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Considering the economic development of Thailand, industrial policies by 
the Thai government, and changes in the market structure and competitive 
conditions, the history of TMT was divided into six periods: (1) Entrance into 
the Thai market (1957 to 1977), (2) Responding to localization and the estab-
lishment of personnel and education systems (1978 to 1985), (3) Rapid growth 
of the automobile market and the response to liberalization policy (1986 to 
1993), (4) The birth of the Asian Car and the currency crisis (1994 to 2003), (5) 
Establishment of an export base and global standard (2004 to 2006), and (6) 
Environmental problems and the development of an “Eco-car” (2007～ ).
2. Entering the Thai Market, 1956-1977
In 1950 Toyota Motor Sales Co. was separated from Toyota Motor Co., 
and the export business of Toyota was transferred to Toyota Sales. Toyota 
Sales began exporting at full swing in 1955. By this time, Toyota established 
its status in the Japanese market, and the Japanese government introduced 
the export promotion policy in cooperation with manufacturers.
Toyota collected basic data on the foreign automobile markets through 
the American Automotive News and on the economic situations in foreign 
countries from Bank of Tokyo. The situation at that time was explained as 
follows:
Considering the line-up and technological level of Toyota cars, it was 
definitely impossible to go into advanced country markets, and inevitably 
we had to develop markets in the developing countries where Western 
car manufacturers had not established a sure foothold. We introduced a 
policy to find a foothold to expand markets targeting Southeast Asia and 
Middle and South America. Particularly in Southeast Asia, advanced 
Western manufacturers skimped on their own work⑸.
Toyota decided on some policies in order to develop the overseas mar-
kets: (1) Establishing an after-service system before sales, (2) avoiding reliance 
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upon general trading companies as much as possible, and (3) avoiding direct 
competition with American automobile companies.
Toyota Motor Sales Co. began developing the Thai market after opening 
the representative office in January 1956. Toyota changed distributors four 
times in two years because they were not capable. Therefore, Toyota 
changed its policy and established the Bangkok Sales Office in February 1957 
to make Thailand a center for developing the Southeast Asian Market. Toy-
ota was the first Japanese automobile company which had a foreign base 
after WWII. This sales office was upgraded branch office in May 1957⑹.
At that time almost all exports from Japan were SKD trucks. Japanese 
staff members from the Branch Service Department directed local workers 
to assemble trucks without cabs by using hoist cranes, forklifts, and wooden 
framed equipment. Coach builders put coach works on the naked chassis. 
Dealers had the responsibility for this coach works, and customers paid Bang-
kok Branch of Toyota for the chassis.
Since the first 13 dealers were miscellaneous shops and rice mills, they 
did not develop their own direct sales systems. Therefore, these dealers 
brought customers’ orders to the branch office, and they were commission-
based dealers, bringing customers to the branch office. This commission-
based system was called the “After Sales Service Allowance”. This was a 
mixture of sales commission and reward for collection of bills⑺.
In the 1960s, the industrialization of Thailand was promoted by the 
import substitution policy. In October 1961 the New Industrial Investment 
Promotion Act was promulgated. In 1961, the Thai government introduced 
the Automobile Industry Promotion Policy, and Ford Motor established a 
joint venture with Anglo Thai (Inchcape), starting CKD assembling. This is 
considered to be the beginning of the Thai automobile industry. By this law 
the import tax on CKD parts was reduced by 50%. In addition, materials and 
equipment were also exempted from import tax. By the time investment 
incentives were suspended in 1969, 11 automobile companies had started 
assembling in Thailand⑻.
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The amended Industrial Investment Promotion Act of 1962 provided 
more incentives to foreign car manufacturers. Therefore, Toyota decided to 
use the incentives garnered by this law to establish Toyota Motor Thailand 
with capital of 11 million baht. This was the Toyota’s second foreign plant 
after its Brazilian counterpart. This plant started production in December in 
1964 to make the “DA Truck” by SKD, and “Tiara”, “Stout”, and “Dina” by 
CKD. This plant had some important processes such as body welding, paint-
ing, assembling chassis, and general assembling.
Toyota’s export to Thailand increased around 1967. Its export to Thai-
land was only 2,300 in 1966, but it increased to 4,200 in 1967, 9,000 in 1968, 
and 10,700 in 1969, accounting for 20% of the Thai market⑼.
In the first half of the 1960s, Toyota and other Japanese automobile man-
ufacturers had to transfer repair and SKD assembling skills of large trucks to 
workers and engineers, and Toyota had to teach white-collar office workers 
know-how related to dealer contracts, installment sales plans, credit account 
management, and parts inventory management. In the late half of the 1960s, 
when Toyota increased its passenger cars, a high level of technology was 
transferred through on the job training. In the 1970s Toyota paid more atten-
tions to technology and know-how in marketing and after service. It 
established its own “training center” to educate and train service men, parts 
and components men, and salespersons⑽.
In the 1960s some automobile plants started operations, but they simply 
imported CKD parts and components and assembled them. So, the Thai gov-
ernment issued a circular notice after establishing the “Committee for the 
Automobile Industry Development” to discuss the development of the auto-
mobile industry.
In 1971 the Ministry of Industry announced the protection policy of 
domestic automobile industry for the first time, getting cooperation from the 
Thai Automotive Industry Association (TAIA). In this policy the Thai gov-
ernment limited the number of car models, and manufacturers had to meet 
the requirement of 25% local contents by 1993 (this local content regulation 
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was started in 1975). As a result, Japanese suppliers such as NHK Spring 
established their subsidiaries in Thailand⑾.
The number of members of the Automobile Committee of the Japanese 
Chamber of Commerce, Bangkok (JCC) increased from 32 in 1974 to 45 in 
1977. TMT expanded the existing plant in 1970. The first new Coronas began 
to come off the lines, increasing the monthly production capacity from 200 to 
600. In order to use incentives for import tax based upon the localization pol-
icy, TMT decided to localize the production of the deck parts of Hilux.
In November 1972, when TMT began operations smoothly, a boycott 
campaign against Japanese products began and anti-Japan feeling exploded. 
In order to deal with this situation, TMT tried to localize itself. It opened its 
stocks in Thailand. Local dealers owned 11.5% and local banks and others 
owned 6.5%⑿.
As TMT increased its production and sales in Thailand, it decided to 
build a second plant in the Samrong area in 1973, and the new plant started 
its operation in May 1975 with a production capacity of 600 a month⒀.
3.  Organizational Response to the Localization Policy and 
the Establishment of Personnel and Education Systems, 
1978-1985
In the early half of the 1970s the Thai economy attained high economic 
growth, but by the middle of the 1970s trade deficits increased again. As a 
result, in January 1978 the Ministry of Commerce announced the New Local-
ization Policy of Passenger Cars to ban the import of completely built 
passenger cars, and increased the import tax on CKD parts. In August 1978 
the local-content ratio of parts was increased from the existing 25% to 50 % 
in1983. TMT had to respond to further localization.
There was a conflict regarding local content between Japanese compa-
nies and their local counterparts. Local companies, which wanted to increase 
local-content ratio, established the Thai Auto-Parts Manufacturers Associa-
tion (TAPMA) in June 1978, separated from the Section of Automobile Parts 
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and Components of the Thai Industrial Associations where Japanese parts 
manufacturers were influential⒁.
During the economic recession in the early half of the 1980s, TAPMA 
made a positive approach to governmental organizations including the Minis-
try of Industry to secure the domestic market. On the other hand, Japanese 
assemblers invited Japanese parts manufacturers to Thailand. Due to the 
development of the parts industry, the Thai automobile industry as a whole 
developed.
Furthermore, Japanese parts and components manufacturers entered the 
Thai market to supply their products to assemblers, responding to the high 
value of the yen following the “Plaza Accord Agreement” in 1985. The num-
ber of members of the JCC’s Automobile Committee increased from 45 in 
1978 to 78 in 1989. Since this subcommittee became large, it was separated 
into two subcommittees: the Four-Wheel Automobile, and Parts and Compo-
nents.
Through these committees the JCC advised on localization policies by 
talking with the Ministry of Industry, BOI, the Automobile Working Group, 
the Japan-Thai Trade and Economic Committee, and the Thai Automobile 
Industry Association. Accepting a request from the JCC, the Ministry of 
Industry froze the local-content ratio at the level of 45% in 1982⒂.
As local content increased, it was necessary to realize a mass-sales sys-
tem to achieve an economy of scale. Therefore, TMT tried to improve the 
system and management of dealers, educating their employees to increase 
sales.
At the beginning of TMT, it had about 20 dealers, which were originally 
small-scale miscellaneous shops and rice mills. TMT provided them with 
dealer loans with a low interest rate to set up showrooms, parts warehouses, 
and service shops. It also guided them with a package of shop design and 
operation manuals, providing various supporting dealer help and educated 
mechanics, parts men, and salespersons. In this way, by the summer of 1982, 
TMT had 70 dealers to develop a nationwide strong sales and after-service 
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network.
Almost of all were owned by Overseas Chinese families. Although shops 
were physically modernized, management remained as it was before. TMT 
tried to strengthen the management of dealers to educate and train the sec-
ond generation of owners who had studied in the United Sates and had new 
sense of management⒃.
At the end of 1984, the Ministry of Industry announced the Automobile 
Industry Promotion Policy, in which 65% of local content was required in the 
case of passenger cars by January 1988 (it was later changed to 54% by July 
1987) for the production of passenger cars and 62% for one-ton pickup trucks 
by July 1988.
To respond to this local-content policy, TMT tried to realize in-house 
production of press parts, establishing the wholly owned Toyota Auto Body 
Thailand in February 1978. It started to produce bodies for Hilux. It also pro-
duced press molds and body jigs because it was very expensive if these were 
imported from Japan.
Twenty-seven parts manufacturers participated in establishing the Toy-
ota Cooperation Club (TCC) in February 1982. TCC trained and educated 
member companies to improve the quality of products, decrease defects, and 
prevent delays in delivery by training sessions, QCC activities, developing 
case studies and organizing study trips to Japan. The first Chairperson of 
TCC was Chalit of CH. Auto Parts (CAP)⒄.
In 1986 the Thai government announced the Local Production Policy of 
Diesel Engines. It emphasized the production of diesel engines for small 
pickup trucks which were the most popular in Thailand. The government 
also emphasized the export of these engines to realize scale merit.
TMT insisted on the local production of diesel engines to increase the 
local-content ratio and improve its image as a Thai company, manufacturing 
engines in Thailand through a joint venture between Siam Toyota Manufac-
turing (STM) and Siam Cement (40%), Nippon Denso (10%) and Industry 
Financial Corporation Thailand(10%), overcoming oppositions from the head-
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quarters in Japan. It expected to increase the local-content ratio from 20% in 
1989 to 80% in 1994. In the production of engines, it was difficult to realize an 
economy of scale if they could not produce more than 250,000 engines. There-
fore, Toyota, Nissan, and Isuzu cooperated together to produce cylinder 
blocks, cylinder heads, connecting rods and crank shafts respectively⒅.
In order to increase the local-content ratio, Japanese part manufacturers 
invested in Thailand. In 1986 Koito Seisakusho established the Thai Koito as 
joint venture with a local company. Koito owned 49% of the capital and the 
Thai counterpart 51%.
Toyota started a horizontal division of labor in producing molds in South-
east Asia, and TMT decided to manufacture molds within the company. 
TMT began exporting molds for fuel tanks to Malaysia in 1988. TMT had 
sent 10 Thai employees from TABT to Japan for training from August to 
November 1987.
By the middle of the 1980s the number of employees of TMT became 
1,150, and the number of Japanese staff members was 11. Thai managers 
including departmental managers and chiefs of sections increased to 39. The 
number of university and special professional school graduates reached 200⒆.
As a result, it became the most important matter to modernize the orga-
nization of the company. First, it was necessary to educate employees. In 
1983 TMT established the “Education Section” in the Personnel Department. 
They provided employees with systematic training based upon their hierar-
chical levels. Then, in 1989 the Education Section has its status raised to 
become the “Human Resource Development Center”, which is now called the 
“TMT Academy”⒇.
The Thai government, which was promoting the development of the 
automobile industry by increasing local-content ratio, was influencing foreign 
companies to promote local employees to management. In 1987, when TMT 
celebrated its 25th anniversary, it decided to follow the governmental policy. 
In October 1987 TMT began reorganization. First, Japanese were taken off 
the positions of departmental manager, and they were appointed as advisors 
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or coordinators. TMT also started regular rotation and promotion of local 
employees21.
During this period, TMT tried to improve the production floors. When 
Takeshi Takahashi was appointed as factory manager of TMT in February 
1984, the shop floors were very dirty and there were slippery and dangerous 
places. In August 1984 he started a 4S campaign, stating as follows:
I tried to clean up the factory, but I could not find any trash cans 
and brooms in the factory. There were smoking people, but there were 
no ashtrays. I started with purchasing brooms and ashtrays and making 
trash cans.
Takahashi, visiting the factory every day to pick up trash on the floor, 
ordered the managers and leaders concerned to clean up the dirty spots. He 
also tried to improve the quality of the products by establishing a “Quality 
Assurance Department” independent from the Technology Department and 
QCC activities22.
4.  Rapid Expansion of the Automobile Market and the 
Response to Liberalization Policy, 1985 to 1993
Thailand experienced economic stagnation from 1985 to 1986. However, 
in 1986 exports of light industry goods and agricultural product began 
increasing. In addition, investment from Japan and Taiwan increased due to 
foreign exchange coordination following the Plaza Accord Agreement in 1985. 
As a result, the Thai economy grew rapidly in the late half of the 1980s, 
experiencing 10% to 12% annual growth rate. This brought an increase of 
personal income, which increased consumption. The production of automo-
biles in Thailand increased from 90,000 in the previous period to 210,000 in 
1989, and Thailand became the largest automobile production country in 
ASEAN. The number of automobile production increased to 300,000 in 1990, 
450,000 in 1993, and 570,000 in 199523.
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How to increase production to respond to rapidly expanding automobile 
market became a very important problem. In September 1989 TMT moved 
from a single shift to two shifts because it was difficult to meet the increas-
ing need for automobiles. Finally, TMT could not produce enough automobiles 
to meet the need in the late half of 1991. TMT had to make a decision to give 
up the production of either the Hilux or passenger cars. TMT selected to 
continue with passenger cars because TMT thought motorization meant the 
rise of a mass market of passenger cars. TMT increased the production from 
1,700 to 2,200 monthly in 199224.
Japanese parts manufacturers tried to increase local supply to respond 
to increasing production by assemblers. Thai Koito increased its capital from 
56. 8 million baht to 113.6 million baht to expand its existing factory. Jidosha 
Buhin Kogyo also expanded its local factory.
Some Japanese parts manufactures entered Thailand for the first time. 
Toyota Gosey established TG Ponpara in January 1994 to produce synthetic 
resin products such as wheel steering. Tokai Rika and Toyota Boshoku estab-
lished Thai Seat Belt with local Summit Auto Seat Belt in June 1994. Tokiko 
established Tokiko Thailand with local parts manufacturers to produce shock 
absorbers in March 1993. Aisin Seiki established Siam Aisin with Siam 
Cement and others to produce various auto parts in October 1996. These are 
merely a few examples.
Since the Thai government protected the domestic automobile industry 
carefully, the production of automobiles could not meet consumer needs. So, 
consumers were forced to buy relatively high-priced cars. Considering the 
worldwide trend of liberalization and consumer needs, the Thai government 
began introducing a liberalization policy in the automobile industry to remove 
a ban on importing small-sized cars in 1990. Moreover, customs on completed 
cars and CKD parts were reduced drastically25.
This liberalization policy had an impact on the Thai automobile industry. 
First, the price gap between passenger cars and commercial vehicles became 
small, and consumer demand for passenger cars increased. Second, the price 
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gap between imported cars and locally produced ones also was reduced.
In 1993 liberalization further progressed, and construction of new plants 
was approved. So, some automobile manufacturers entered the Thai market. 
In 1994 BOI decided to give incentives to auto assemblers located in local 
areas so that Thailand would be the central base to export completed cars. 
As a part of liberalization, the import tax on materials for parts was reduced 
by stages. A local-content ratio of 54% remained for passenger cars. How-
ever, local content infringed the TRIM of GATT, and its removal was 
expected in five years.
In order to respond to the rapid growth of the automobile market, TMT 
built a third plant in Samrong in January 1990. However, as they tried to 
increase production, they had problems ensuring the quality of products. As 
a result, TMT tackled it through a “Year of Quality Movement”. Quality was 
improved drastically within two years.
As localization progressed, the operations and organization of TMT 
changed to be managed by Thai employees. Until the middle of 1987 depart-
ment managers who controlled functional operations were all Japanese. TMT 
always had to consult with HQ in Japan and imitate its personnel manage-
ment including promotion. Japanese were excluded from the positions of 
section and department management. They put many Thai employees in 
these positions.
By 1987 individual departments were required to make five-year plans. 
Whenever new Japanese bosses came from Japan, they changed existing 
plans. This made Thai people confused. Therefore, departmental plans were 
discussed in the meetings of departmental managers where top management 
approved these plans. These plans were fixed as departmental plans. Annual 
plans were also made.
In this way, “Thainization”, which meant “management by Thai”, had 
become popular in 1987. TMT developed this idea further after 1992. The 
process of Thainization was clearly shown in some figures. Between 1988 and 
1994, while the number of total employees increased from 1,287 to 3,712, the 
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number of Japanese expatriates only increased from 14 to 26. The Thai man-
agers increased from 106 to 212 in the same period. As Thai employees 
obtained opportunities to get promotions, a promotion system was estab-
lished, creating a “Promotion Committee”26.
In September 1992, monthly sales of TMT reached more than 10,000 
cars. At the same time, the market structure was changing. Sales of passen-
ger cars increased more rapidly than those of commercial vehicles, which 
showed the coming of an advanced-country type of motorization.
Under these circumstances, an annual production of 200,000 cars was 
expected by the early 1990s. As a result, in March 1992 TMT bought a piece 
of 2 million ㎡ land for the construction of a new plant in Gateway.
Regarding exports, in 1987 Siam Nissan exported five one-ton pickup 
trucks to Pakistan and 40 passenger cars to Brunei. Mitsubishi took leader-
ship in exporting on a full scale. Mitsubishi, as a global strategy, began 
exporting cars from Shitipole in Thailand to Canada Clyster in January 1988, 
making a plan to export 100,000 in six years. In 1992 Mitsubishi began export-
ing its one-ton pickup truck to Europe.
Toyota followed Mitsubishi, and in 1992 TMT began exporting one-ton 
pickup trucks to Laos and Pakistan. It worked out a plan to increase produc-
tion capacities by three times to 150,000 by 1993 to export on a full scale. The 
main export model was Hilux, and it was expected to export 50,000 cars 
annually to the United States, Europe, and Indochina as well as Japan. In Feb-
ruary 1993, TMT planned to increase production capacities to 200,00027.
In October 1988 a “Memorandum on a Brand to Brand Complementation 
Scheme (BBC)” was agreed upon at the 20th ASEAN Economic Cabinet Mem-
bers Meeting, emphasizing economy of scale and accelerating regional trade. 
As an incentive, when the value added of BBC products in ASEAN is more 
than 50%, they are given a minimum 50% of the preference bound tariff rate.
Toyota, which had production bases in each ASEAN country, tried to 
assemble competitive cars in each country by supplying parts effectively. 
Toyota introduced a policy to consider the Southeast Asian market as a 
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whole. Toyota established Toyota Auto Parts Philippines and T&K Auto 
Parts in Malaysia for mutual complementary and intensive production of 
parts and components in ASEAN countries28.
Toyota established Toyota Motor Service Singapore in Singapore to man-
age this complementary system. In 1991 they developed a complementary 
supply of parts among production bases among ASEAN countries on a full 
scale in 1991. By using BBC they distributed shock absorbers from Malaysia 
to Thailand and pressed parts from Thailand to the Philippines. In 1992 trans-
missions were distributed from the Philippines to Thailand, Malaysia, and 
Indonesia, and steering gears were distributed from Malaysia T&K (see 
Chart 1).
In April 2001 Toyota established Toyota Motor Asia Pacific (TMAP) in 
order to respond to local markets by pricing and planning of sales promo-
tions. In May of the same year, TMAP established Toyota Service Parts 
Consolidation Center Singapore in order to develop effective distribution of 
parts among countries in Asia.
Chart 1　Toyota’s Parts Comlimentary Plan In ASEAN Countries
Source: Toyota Motor Corporation.
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In addition, TMT, which has become a large and established company, 
was expected to make a social contribution to Thailand. In 1992 the Thai 
Toyota Foundation was established with a fund of 30 million baht. In 2000, 
the fund increased to 400 million baht. Its activities included aiding education, 
improving life, and environment, and cooperative activities with other organi-
zations. In the “Corporate Image Survey” conducted in December 2001, TMT 
was selected as No. 1 among local and foreign companies29.
5.  The Birth of the Asian Car and the Currency Crisis, 
1994 to 2003
In 1992 Toyota decided to develop a special car for emerging markets, 
especially Asian countries. The Asian passenger car market was expected to 
grow with the rise of middle-class people in the future, but imported Japa-
nese cars became very expensive due to the high value of the yen. Korean 
and American automobile manufacturers began chasing after Japanese coun-
terparts. Their plan was to develop low-price cars suitable for the Asian 
market without excessive quality and functions by cutting production costs 
by 5 to 10%30.
TMT was selected as a production site for Asian cars because it was the 
top automobile manufacturer in Thailand, which was coming into the motor 
car age. As a result, the development of the “Asian Car (Soluna)” started 
through the cooperation between Toyota HQ and TMT. Ninnart, who was 
the Manager of the Department of Technology at TMT, led this project 
under the slogan of “Producing Cars for Thai by Thai”.
In 1997 TMT announced it would sell the lowest-priced Soluna for 
327,000 baht, which was the first mass-produced passenger car which was 
sold at a price less than 350,000 baht. In order to decrease the cost, parts 
were produced in Thailand as much as possible. At that time, the local-con-
tent ratio was 54%, but the Soluna’s local-content ratio was expected to be 
70%.
The Soluna was very popular, and production and sales started smoothly. 
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However, its popularity came not from the image of the car for Thai but 
from TMT’s established reliability, durability, safety, and economy. Introduc-
tion of the Soluna brought not the direct effect to develop the impression of 
cars developed by Thai but the indirect effect to increase the brand image of 
Thai Toyota and the morale of Thai employees.
In the process of motorization, TMT began making strenuous efforts to 
improve the production floors because it faced changes of environment such 
as increasing production volume, the high value of the yen, and intensive 
price competition with rival automobile manufacturers. So in the case of the 
Soluna, TMT set up the price first. Then, it had to adjust to a certain range 
of cost after subtracting the profit instead of compiling up the cost31.
In 1995, TMT replaced production for stock replenishment with a build-
to-order system on a monthly basis which was expected to be weekly based 
in the future. At the same time, it introduced the kanban system in transac-
tion with Japanese part manufacturers within 30 to 40 ㎞ .
TMT began introducing the Toyota Production System on a full scale. In 
April 1994 Takeo Yahagi was transferred from the Takaoka Plant in Japan 
to TMT as senior vice president in charge of production. He said, “The Toy-
ota Production System means a cycle of finding problems, seeking their 
causes, and solving them.” After training six Thai as trainers, they spread the 
“idea of kaizen” among team leaders and foremen.
TMT also paid attention to human resource development. In June 1996 it 
established TMT General Education and Training Center which was the larg-
est among centers in foreign countries. In addition, they trained capable 
employees among dealers. As localization of management progressed, English 
was used as a means of communication between TMT and Japanese HQ as 
well as between Japanese expatriates and Thai employees32.
In April 1996, ASEAN Industrial Cooperation Scheme (AICO), a compre-
hensive and full-scale supplementary agreement, was enforced. Laos and 
Myanmar participated in ASEAN in 1997, and Cambodia in 1999. As a result, 
ASEAN included all Southeast Asian countries. Automobile manufacturers 
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were forced to make a new scheme to respond to the ASEAN Free Trade 
Area (AFTA), which decided to decrease import tax among ASEAN coun-
tries drastically in 200333.
The Asian Currency Crisis, which happened in June 1997 in Thailand, 
caused serious damage to the automobile industry in ASEAN. To deal with 
the situation, ASEAN agreed to decrease customs to 0% to 5% in 2003, which 
had been planned to be done in 2008. In July 1997 depreciation of the baht 
was announced. The Thai economy became stagnant, and demand for auto-
mobiles dropped drastically. The automobile market shrunk by 38.4% in 1997 
and 60.3% in 1998. As a result, production lines of the Samrong and Gateway 
plants were stopped completely from the middle of November to December. 
TMT tried to maintain a “No Lay-Off Policy”. However, the situation was 
very serious, and it had to resort to home lay-offs and proposed early and vol-
untary retirements.
The Thai government encouraged Japanese auto manufacturers to make 
Thailand a world base to export pickup trucks by concentrating the auto 
parts industry in Thailand by making use of the favorable exporting environ-
ment. This required the independence and self-sustenance of Japanese 
subsidiaries to realize competitive export ability. Koichi Shimokawa discusses 
the situation as follows:
Hitherto, development of cars which were produced in this area was 
done at Headquarters in Japan. Regarding important parts, particularly 
engines and driving gears, Japanese suppliers enforced VA/VE activities. 
These activities were expected to be localized, and TMT would take all 
the quality assurance responsibility. Therefore, TMT gave a broad range 
of authority to local engineers and started transactions with local suppli-
ers by an approved drawing system and quality assurance34.
Facing a serious crisis, Japanese companies began increasing exports of 
their products. Japanese companies changed their policies from making Thai-
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land a base as regional division of labor in ASEAN to making Thailand an 
important base for global business.
The currency crisis brought about by depreciation of the Thai baht 
became a favorable wind for exports of completed cars, KD parts, and com-
ponents, and exports brought profits. This was a very good opportunity for 
Thai employees to understand how it would be difficult to catch up with Jap-
anese products in the terms of quality and functions. As exports from 
Thailand increased, the enhancement of quality of products was strength-
ened, and level of technology steadily improved. The quality of parts was 
particularly improved with the years.
In summer 1998, exports of pickup trucks from Japan to Oceania were 
transferred to TMT. Some parts were also exported to South Africa and 
other places. Japanese parts manufacturers like Denso, Toyoda Gosei, Sango 
and others began exporting their products to Japan, the United States, India, 
and other countries.
Japanese auto manufacturers cooperated together through the Japanese 
Chamber of Commerce, Bangkok. They organized a working group composed 
of purchasing and buying managers. They discussed two things. One was the 
“global level of quality”. The other was supporting suppliers financially. In 
October 1997 TMT had a meeting to explain its production plan. It talked to 
200 people from parts manufacturing companies that TMT would support in 
the crisis. TMT provided them with funds for model-change equipment and 
working capital. As a result, no parts manufacturers went bankrupt. In addi-
tion, the quality improvement movement improved the quality of parts 
produced in Thailand, and they came to supply Ford and GM which were 
making Thailand an export base35.
6.  Establishment of an Export Base and Global Standard, 
2004 to 2006
Around 2002 every auto manufacturer in Thailand began increasing 
exports. There are two reasons. First, many Japanese parts manufacturers 
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entered the Thai markets, and they transferred technology and management 
know-how to Thailand. In 2005 more than 1 million automobiles were pro-
duced in Thailand, accounting for about 7% of the total export values. Second, 
Asian countries made FTA agreements with many countries outside 
ASEAN. For example, Thailand made an FTA agreement with Australia, 
and 15% of import tax on passenger cars was removed in Australia36.
In August 2000, TMT announced that in Thailand, which had become 
the biggest production base in Southeast Asia, it would realize 100% local-
content ratio. At that time, TMT was producing one model of commercial 
vehicle and three models of passenger cars. The local-content ratio of com-
mercial cars was 80%, and 55% to 78 % for passenger cars.
In March 2000 TMT made the “Thai for Excellent Project Plan”, and 
explained it to 110 Japanese and local parts manufacturers. As part of this 
project, TMT asked local manufacturers to produce products imported from 
Japan in Thailand. TMT also asked manufacturers of industrial materials 
such as forging pressed products and iron sheets to invest in ASEAN37.
Many Japanese companies entered the Thai market. In November 2000 
Sumitomo Denko Brake Systems established SEI Brake Systems (Thailand) 
to produce pads for disk brakes. In September 1999 Sekisui established 
Sekisui S-LEC (Thailand), and in April 2002 it started to produce special resin 
sheets for windshields. In February 2002 IHI established IHI Turbo Thailand 
to produce turbo chargers. Nikof established Nikof Thailand to produce resin 
for automobile fasteners. Aichi Seiko and Toyota Tusho also established local 
companies to produce automobile parts38.
Other companies such as Character (Thailand) and STB Textiles 
expanded their plants, judging they could secure cost competitiveness in pro-
ducing their products in Thailand. As a result, TMT had 117 first-tier parts 
manufacturers (including 35 local companies) and more than 2,000 second-tier 
part manufacturers. The 35 local companies were owned by almost the same 
five business groups.
TCC played a very important role in transferring the Toyota Production 
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System (TPS) to these local companies through self-study groups and the 
TPS Dojo (drill hall). In TPS self-study groups, they organized five groups, 
and one group was composed of five to eight companies. Member companies 
were to learn TPS from the leader company of the group.
In the case of the TPS Dojo, they selected five companies which had a 
certain technological level. They set up a model line in one company, and 
member companies learned the pull-production system. Professionals of TPS 
were sent for three weeks from Toyota HQ in Japan at TMT’s cost. TCC 
also provided staff members of member companies with education and train-
ing including top management and middle management seminars39.
By the latter half of 2002, the Thai automobile industry had become 
active. TMT moved to two shifts at Samrong Plant which produced pickup 
trucks. In 2002 Toyota was expected to transfer production of an export 
model pickup to Thailand, TMT decided to expand its production capacity to 
300,000 units annually. In addition, the Gateway plant moved from one shift to 
two shifts to produce three types of passenger cars: Camry, Corolla, and Sol-
una Vios.
In August 2004 Toyota introduced a new Asian strategy, announcing the 
Innovative International Multi-purpose Vehicle (IMV) which was to be pro-
duced in ASEAN. The first IMV was Hilux Vigo, produced in Thailand in 
September 2004. The IMV was expected to be produced in 11 countries 
including Thailand, Indonesia, South Africa, Argentina, India, Malaysia, Vene-
zuela, Vietnam, Taiwan, and Pakistan, and to be sold in more than 80 
countries in Southeast Asia, South America, Africa, and the Middle East. In 
addition, parts and components for pickup trucks and multipurpose vehicles 
were expected to be exported to Toyota’s manufacturing companies in nine 
countries.
All the cars produced at the Hamura Plant of Isuzu, a member company 
of the Toyota Group, were completely transferred to TMT, producing the 
Hilux Vigo in August 2004, and Thai Auto Works began manufacturing the 
Fortuner in January 2005. In January 2007 the Ban Pho Plant was established 
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to produce only the IMV.
The IMV project was a response to the rising automobile industry in 
China, and Toyota developed a tripod system composed of China, ASEAN, 
and Japan with a concept to develop a division of labor and self-sustenance 
by differentiating car models and obtaining autonomous competitiveness. 
Toyota and its suppliers invested 700 million dollars to make Thailand a 
global production base.
Toyota Technical Center Asia Pacific Thailand (TTCAP) was established 
in October 2003 in a suburb of Bangkok, which has more than 600 staff mem-
bers today. This center was established to develop trucks and passenger cars 
which would be produced in the Asian market. This was a reflection of 
Toyta’s slogan “to localize the production base which is closest and respond 
to the diversified consumer demand of the market.”
One of the most important factors which made Thailand a production 
center in ASEAN was a drastic increase in local-content ratio. Before the 
IMV, TMT’s local-content ratio was 60%. Around 2000 Toyota promoted 
major parts manufacturers of the group to enter the Thai market. As a 
result, the local content ratio went up to 96%. Cooperation from parts manu-
facturers was necessary to develop the IMV.
By the time of the new millennium, cars could not just be sold for a low 
price. Gradually, Asian cars were expected to change from “Asian Quality 
and Asian Price” to “Global Quality and Asian Price”. Moreover, TMT 
expanded its production capacity from 70,000 to 200,000 in 2004 to make 
Thailand the “export base for Asia and Europe”40.
TMT also considered the timing when ASEAN expected to develop 
AFTA in 2003 to decrease customs on regional trades to less than 5%, creat-
ing a huge market of 500 million people and a GDP of 600 trillion dollars. 
Japanese, European, and American automobile companies invested in Thai-
land, where they could procure parts and components easily to assemble 
automobiles to export outside the region. In this way, TMT started produc-
tion and export of the IMV. In July 2010 TMT celebrated the production of 1 
437
Roles of Multinational Companies in the Self-Sustenance 
of the Thai Automobile Industry: The Case of Toyota Motor Thailand
651
million IMVs. Needless to say, the IMV project made TMT leap to become a 
global production base.
TMT promoted localization of management and tried to solve local prob-
lems without reference to HQ. Ninnart was promoted from executive 
managing director to senior vice president. Three more Thai were promoted 
to board members. Out of 14 board members, five were Thai including Pra-
mon, the Chairperson, whom TMT invited from Siam Cement41.
7.  Environmental Problems and the Development of the 
“Eco-car”, 2007 ～
Toyota drew a scenario to make the overseas market an engine for the 
growth of the company since the total demand for automobiles in Japan had 
failed to grow. In August 2007, Toyota announced that the target sales of the 
Toyota group including Daihatsu and Hino would be around 10.4million units, 
targeting emerging markets such as China, India, and Southeast Asian coun-
tries.
In 2000 Toyota had made a plan to increase production in Asia including 
China to 2.1million units. The IMV was developed as the spearhead to 
develop emerging markets. To increase sales in Indonesia, Thailand, India, 
and Brazil, Toyota expanded its production capacity including opening the 
Ban Pho Plant in spring 2007. In addition, Toyota started developing an 
“Entry Family Car (EFC)” at a price of 700,000 yen and expected to start sell-
ing in India in 2010.
However, in Thailand sales of the cars dropped by 7.5% to 631,251 in 
2007. This was due to a slowdown of consumption and a steep rise in gasoline 
prices after a military coup in September 200642.
Toyota reorganized operations in Southeast Asia including Thailand. 
Toyota established Toyota Motor Asia Pacific Thailand (TMAP Thailand) in 
Samut Prakan to control production bases in Asia. Ryoichi Sasaki, the Manag-
ing Director of Toyota Motor Corporation and the former president of TMT 
became president of this company. In addition, he became president of two 
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other companies: TMAP Thailand which is a production subsidiary in Thai-
land, and Toyota Marketing Asia Pacific Singapore, a marketing and sales 
supporting company in Singapore.
The purpose of TMAP Thailand was that Thai staff members, who car-
ried out the IMV project, would support production in Asia as a whole. 
TMAP Thailand was in charge of manufacturing, purchasing, physical distri-
bution, and quality assurance. Therefore, almost all the staff members were 
transferred from TMT.
TMAP Thailand supports 11 production bases including six assembly 
plants in seven countries and areas. Toyota tried to decrease costs and 
increase local-content ratio by integrating the purchasing functions of these 
six assembly plants. This company also tried to transfer technology to indi-
vidual production bases. On the other hand, TMAP Singapore was in charge 
of marketing and sales operations, supporting all the sales activities in Asia.
In August 2005 Toyota established the Asia Pacific Global Production 
(Training) Center (AP-GPC) in Toyota Motor Asia Pacific (TMAP) in Samut 
Prakan. Twenty-four staff members, who are approved by the Global Produc-
tion Center in Japan, are always on site. This center was expected to have a 
hub function to support production, to share know-how, and promote staff 
exchange and human resource development43.
At AP-GPC they carry out skill training of eight production processes 
such as pressing, painting, assembling, and quality management by using real 
production lines. This training center is composed of three departments: shop 
floor management development, production support and management, and 
basic skill training.
In August 2006, Toyota announced that AP-GPC in Thailand would 
accept employees for training from Toyota’s production bases in the Philip-
pines, Taiwan, Indonesia, Vietnam, India, Malaysia, and Australia in addition 
to Thailand. Before this announcement, employees outside Thailand had train-
ing in Japan. Furthermore, in November 2006 Toyota transferred all the 
functions of TMAP to Toyota Technical Center Asia Pacific Thailand, and 
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TMAP was closed44.
In Thailand, as the economy grew at a 5% of annual growth rate, people’s 
income also increased. Consumers began having more interest in passenger 
cars than in pickup trucks. The Thaksin administration noticed this change, 
and it developed an “Eco-car Policy”, a policy to develop a small car in 2004. 
However, it introduced a standard which was close to the Japanese light-type 
car (less than 3.6 meters long and less than 1.63 meters wide). Automobile 
manufacturers that did not have light-type car lines, such as Toyota and 
Isuzu, opposed this plan. As a result, this eco-car plan was not realized.
It had become necessary for the Thai government to realize this small 
car project in order to enhance its presence in the global automobile industry. 
In November 2006 the Surayud Administration confirmed this eco-car project 
by following the Thaksin Administration’s idea to give incentives to small-car 
production. At the same time, the Thai government placed this eco-car proj-
ect as a pillar of exports.
The eco-car project had three objectives. The first objective was to real-
ize the “Detroit of Asia” plan to become one of the important automobile 
production countries, attaining a production of 1.8 million cars a year. The 
second was to establish a production base of world niche cars following 
pickup trucks. The third was to improve the balance of trade by decreasing 
crude oil imports and replacing energy-inefficient cars with efficient cars.
The producers obtained an incentive from BOI to be exempted from cor-
porate tax for eight years. The Ministry of Finance decided to decrease the 
commodity tax on cars with less than 2,000 cc engine from 30% to 17%. The 
deadline for application was November 2007.
In June 2009 the Thai government introduced a new eco-car policy to 
become a country where hybrid and substitute energy cars were produced.
Honda received approval to produce eco-cars in October 2007, Nissan 
and Suzuki in December 2007, TMT in April 2008. Nissan started production 
of the March as an eco-car, and the Thai-made March was exported to 
Japan45.
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TMT planned to invest 6.642 billion baht to start production of 100,000 
eco-cars annually in the Gateway Plant in November 2008. Fifty percent of 
the production was expected to be exported. Toyota tried to develop low 
energy-consumption cars. Finally, TMT is planning to start production of eco-
cars in 2012.
Along with the Thai government’s eco-car policy, TMT stated to realize 
an eco-car in three directions. The first was the use of substitute energy such 
as Compressed Natural Gas (CNG), B5 (5% of Bio Diesel Fuel in gas oil), and 
E20 (Bioethanol mixed fuel). The second was the improvement of diesel 
engines by introducing Diesel D1 (Bio Diesel Fuel) and diesel common rail. 
The third was the Introduction of a Variable Valve Timing Lift structure in 
gasoline engine and a hybrid engine.
In the concrete plan, TMT introduced E20 in all the passenger models. 
In 2009 it introduced the Corolla Limo CNG and the Corolla CNG (manual 
transmission). It also started to produce and sell the HV Camry in August 
2009. This HV Camry was the first Thai-made HV vehicle to have been intro-
duced to the Asia Pacific region. In comparison with the ordinary gasoline 
engine Camry, the HV Camry could improve fuel consumption by 30% and 
torque by 20%, decreasing CO2 by 30%. Prices of these models were cut by 
5% due to incentives46.
8. Conclusion
In this paper, we analyzed how and why TMT has accumulated its own 
management resources to achieve self-sustenance through its 50-year history. 
In 2004 TMT became the world center for the IMV project. In this project, 
TMT has the responsibility of a value chain from designing and production to 
sales and exports without the mother factory in Japan. This clearly shows 
that TMT has become independent and can play its own role in Toyotas’ 
global strategy.
At the same time, in addition to the analysis of TMT’s strategy and 
structure, we analyzed the mutual reactions between TMT and other actors 
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in the automobile industry to form the automobile industrial cluster in Thai-
land. Here, we summarize this study and clarify the findings and their 
significance in the globalization of Japanese multinationals.
First, we looked at the changing strategies of Toyota. In the 1950s as the 
first stage, Toyota began exporting its products to foreign countries including 
Thailand. Then, Toyota established TMT in 1962. Toyota transferred produc-
tion and management know-how to TMT. In the 1960s, the Thai government 
introduced the import substitution policy, decreasing customs on CKD parts. 
Furthermore, in 1969 TMT had to respond to the local-content policy of the 
Thai government. In 1971, completed cars were prohibited to be imported, 
and TMT had to meet a local-content ratio of 62% for passenger cars and 
35% of pickup trucks by 1988.
In the 1990s, TMT entered the new stage. Thailand attained a high eco-
nomic growth in the late 1980s, and the Thai government changed its policy 
to liberalize the import of small cars. In 1990 Toyota introduced a new strat-
egy to develop an “Asian Car” to meet the increasing needs for passenger 
cars in Southeast Asia. TMT was selected. TMT developed a car, saying “A 
car for Thai by Thai”. In 1992, TMT started exports of its one-ton pickup 
trucks to Laos and Pakistan, and a full-scale export policy was announced in 
February 1993. As a result, TMT came to achieve self-sustenance to play a 
role in Toyota’s global strategies.
TMT’s move to independence was accelerated after the Asian Currency 
Crisis. Toyota shifted to a policy of international division of labor, making 
Thailand an overseas production base. As a result, technology transfer 
between HQ and TMT came to be spontaneous and more sophisticated.
After the currency crisis, as the Thai market shrunk drastically, it was 
required to exports Thai-made cars. It was necessary to realize the global 
level of quality and functions. Furthermore, TMT’s strategy to start the IMV 
project accelerated independence of TMT. Toyota positioned TMT as the 
world base of IMV. IMV was the first car which did not have a mother fac-
tory in Japan.
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The strategy of TMT changed in 2004 when the Thaksin Administration 
proposed the idea of an eco-car. It was necessary for Thailand to be success-
ful in a small-car strategy in order to heighten its presence in the world 
automobile industry. In June 2007 the Thai government embarked upon this 
eco-car project on a full scale. TMT will attempt to manufacture and sell eco-
cars in 2012.
Some factors gave an impact on TMT to change its strategies. The most 
influential one was the Thai government’s industrial policy. Particularly, until 
the beginning of the liberalization policy in the 1980s, the Thai government 
introduced an import substitution policy and a local-content policy. In the 
early 1990s it changed its import substitution policy to an export promotion 
policy, and exports became very important for Thailand after the currency 
crisis in 1997. After 2007 TMT responded to the eco-car policy.
In the 2000s the automobile industry in the ASEAN 4 developed, and 
ASEAN Free Trade Area (AFTA) came into sight. TMAP, TMAP Thailand, 
and TTCAP were established to coordinate purchasing, production, and mar-
keting activities in Southeast Asia. In August 2005, the Asia-Pacific 
Production Support Center was established. In August 2006 it announced that 
it would accept employees of 12 Toyota subsidiaries in nine countries includ-
ing Taiwan and India. The function of TMAP was integrated into TTCAP to 
become TMAP-EM.
Along the changes of strategies, TMT had to change its organization and 
train employees to realize these strategies. It made efforts to transfer tech-
nologies from production to sales and after service. Since TMT began to hire 
university graduates in 1963, it has been localizing management. In Decem-
ber 1969, Toyota established the first overseas general training center in 1969 
to train local employees systematically.
In the middle of the 1980s, TMT began introducing TPS aggressively to 
ensure quality in the production processes. In the middle of the 1980s, the 
Thai government exerted influences over foreign multinationals to localize 
management. Following this policy, TMT supported localization of manage-
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ment which was called “Thainization”.
In addition to the Thai government, TMT had to develop relationships 
with some other actors. As a hub of the automobile industry, TMT made a 
value chain in automobile industry.
The first aspect of the value chain was sales. In the beginning, Toyota 
cars were imported and sold. When Toyota came into the Thai market, its 
dealers were not strong. Therefore, Toyota had to introduce the modern con-
cept of sales methods and after services to them.
The second aspect of the value chain was manufacturing. When TMT 
was established, it developed simple CKD by importing parts and assembling 
them. After the Thai government introduced the local content policy, TMT 
had to increase the local-content ratio. First, it invited Japanese functional 
part manufacturers such as Denso (radiator) and Nippatsu (suspension). Some-
times, TMT had to produce main parts such as engines and cab press parts 
for the Hilux by establishing TABT and STM.
TMT also had to develop local parts manufacturers. Through TCC, it 
transferred TPS to local parts manufacturers. Local contents increased with 
the introduction of the Asian Car, IMV, and eco-cars. Depending on the devel-
opment stages of the automobile industry in Thailand, different types of 
Japanese parts manufacturers entered the Thai market.
In addition to local procurement, it became very important to procure 
parts within the ASEAN region. In October 1988, the BBC scheme was intro-
duced. AICO was agreed upon in 1996, and AFTA was enforced in 2003. 
Here, we can find activities of multinationals that can be seen at the regional 
level between global and local,.
In this way, Thailand became a center for production of cars in ASEAN 
by accumulating pressing, mold, sheet metal, and precision machining. This 
was accelerated as a result of TMT’s strategies to exports Thai products and 
the localization of management.
The self-sustenance of TMT made Kyoichi Tanada say, “Considering 47 
years of experience and the high quality of Thai engineers of TMT, I hope 
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designing and production may be all done in Thailand!47”
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